[Granville-Hough] 31 Jan 2010 - Spanish Heroes

[Trustees for Granville W. Hough]

Date: Sun, 31 Jan 2010 08:30:34 -0800
From: Granville W Hough <gwhough at oakapple.net>
Subject: Spanish Heroes - 31 Jan 2010

SPANISH HEROES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: FRANCISCO SAAVEDRA DE SANGRONIS

American historians who have encountered the name Francisco Saavedra 
have been puzzled and perplexed by it. In his 1969 dissertation on New 
Spain, Melvin Bruce Glascock stated in a footnote: ôThe exact identity 
of Francisco Saavedra and his mission to New Spain remain a 
mysteryà(Endnote 1.) ôàBancroft describes him as a mysterious stranger 
who had no specific duties but who had access to the highest official 
circlesà (Endnote 2.) Bustamente has written that Saavedra was an agent 
of the Minister of the Indies (Jos‰ de Gßlvez) sent to criticize the 
unfortunate Viceroy (Mayorga)àö (Endnote 3.) Jonathan Dull partly 
understood the importance of Saavedra but completely misunderstood his 
role and activities, inadvertently crediting Bernardo de Gßlvez with 
activities and events which were not within BernardoÆs authority. 
(Endnote 4.) Caughey, most quoted biographer of Bernardo de Gßlvez, does 
not index Saavedra at all.

To remain ignorant about SaavedraÆs role in the Western Hemisphere is to 
misunderstand how Yorktown came about, and how that Yorktown victory was 
secured by two more years of relentless pressure on British forces and 
holdings in the West Indies, holding of which at the time was BritainÆs 
highest priority. (BritainÆs first objective had been accomplished when 
she secured her homeland in the failed invasion of Britain in the summer 
of 1779, so her sugar lands and timber sources moved up to first 
priority.) BritainÆs third objective of reconquering her former colonies 
came to a halt at Yorktown; but it was merely set aside until her West 
Indies and other priority objectives could be managed. Recall that 
Charleston, New York, Penobscot Bay, and Detroit were staging bases held 
in readiness for future campaigns.

Few Americans have ever heard of the de Grass/Saavedra Convention which 
governed Franco-Spanish operations in the Western Hemisphere from Jul 
1781 until the end of the war. Yet this Convention set up the Chesapeake 
Bay Expedition for de Grasse which resulted in Yorktown. Most Americans 
would know that General Rochambeau himself returned to France, but few 
have ever learned that his entire Expeditionary Force, so successful at 
Yorktown, went to a Venezuela staging area for the forthcoming invasion 
of British Jamaica. Naval buffs all remember the battle at Les Saintes, 
where British Admiral Rodney captured French Admiral de Grasse, but few 
would recall that de Grasse saved the troops he was moving into position 
for the Jamaica invasion. Few Americans would know that this invasion 
was first planned in Spain in 1778, a year before Spain declared war, 
and that Saavedra worked on the plan. Few Americans would know that 
ships and men were waiting in Spanish and French ports as reinforcements 
for this invasion, and that Marquis de Lafayette was designated as 
Governor-to-be of Jamaica. The British were placed in a position having 
a noose being tightened, notch by notch, on their West Indies/Central 
American holdings. So they negotiated for peace on the best terms they 
could get. In studying this planned invasion of Jamaica, as it evolved 
month by month, one of the most frequent names encountered is that of 
Saavedra.

So, who was Francisco Saavedra de Sangronis? Born in 1746 to an upper 
class family in Seville, he was educated in Granada, by seventeen years 
of age a licenciada and doctor. He was interested in the military, and 
both he and Bernardo de Gßlvez served in the campaign against the Moors 
in Algiers. Bernardo in 1776 offered to introduce Saavedra to his uncle, 
Jos‰ de Gßlvez, who had just taken over the new Ministry of the Indies. 
Saavedra became well acquainted with the Gßlvez family and resigned his 
commission in order to join the Ministry of the Indies. First he did 
financial planning, though he did get involved in military strategies as 
well. By May 1778, he had taken part in a plan to invade Jamaica, which 
alerted Spanish officials in America to the real probability of war. In 
June 1780, while Saavedra was still working on financial aspects of the 
war, the news came that General Bernardo de Gßlvez had captured Mobile. 
Pensacola was the next Spanish goal. At this time Minister Jos‰ de 
Gßlvez and King Carlos III had become aware that bureaucratic wrangling 
in Havana was interfering with the war effort. King Carlos III needed a 
man in the West Indies who knew the plans and views of the King and 
Spanish court, who could attend military juntas and bring leaders into 
agreement, who could confer with officials of allied nations, remit 
funds from one place to another, and go freely wherever the KingÆs word 
and prestige were needed. In other words, King Carlos needed someone to 
knock heads together and get instant compliance. Saavedra agreed to take 
the role, King Carlos III authorized the appointment, and Saavedra was 
on his way to America by first available transportation. Saavedra very 
carefully kept a journal, unfortunately not published in English until 
1988, Journal of Don Francisco Saavedra de Sangronis during the 
Commission that he held in his charge from 25 June 1780 until June 1783. 
(Endnote 5.). So, in this journal and in the confidential letters to 
Havana and other officials, it is clear that Saavedra was speaking for 
the King, who expected punctual and effective compliance to SaavedraÆs 
requests. In his oral instructions, Saavedra was told to get Pensacola 
into Spanish control and eliminate Britain from the Gulf of Mexico; send 
all available money to Spain; get Britain out of Central America; unite 
French and Spanish units into a joint effort to invade Jamaica and 
eliminate Britain from the West Indies, or any other joint operation 
which circumstances might dictate. (There was no mention of North 
America, unless it was implied in the last phrase.)

After several delays in his journey, SaavedraÆs vessel, the frigate 
Diana, was captured after a spirited fight by the British warship, 
Pallas, and the prisoners were taken into Jamaica. Saavedra, 
understanding financial matters, passed himself off as a wealthy 
merchant seeking trade opportunities. Under this guise, he made many 
friends and was able to travel around Jamaica and analyze its forts and 
harbors. These analyses gave him the intimate knowledge on how an 
invasion could be accomplished. He also met other Spanish officers, 
prisoners from the British invasion of Central America, from whom he 
learned the situation of Governor-General Matas de Gßlvez of Guatamala. 
Eventually, he was able to get a French cartel ship to take him to Cuba 
in Jan 1781, six months after he started on his mission.

He first met with his old friend Bernardo de Gßlvez, who gave him the 
current situation, then with the Governor and Army and Navy Commanders. 
A junta was called for 1 Feb, and he negotiated and maneuvered 
tirelessly through February in gaining support for the Pensacola 
operation and for General Matas de Gßlvez in Central America. As soon 
as these forces were on their way in March, he worked somewhat on the 
long-range plans for invading Jamaica, but mainly on providing 
reinforcements for Pensacola. Realizing that Pensacola was the priority 
objective, he pushed for combined French and Spanish reinforcements and 
embarked with them on 9 Apr 1781. He was able to take part in the final 
assaults on the forts at Pensacola and on preparing the surrender terms 
for 9 May 1781. On 16 May he returned to Havana to send to Spain news of 
the British surrender. When he arrived, he found dispatches which showed 
results of his earlier reports. The Governor, the Army Commander, and 
the Navy Commander had all been replaced with people with whom he could 
work more effectively. General Bernardo de Gßlvez had been promoted to 
Lt General and became the new Army Commander. Saavedra sent this news on 
to Bernardo, who was still at Pensacola. From the Minister of the West 
Indies, Jos‰ de Gßlvez, Saavedra received on 18 Jun instructions that he 
was to go to Cap Fran‡ois where he could confer with French Admiral 
Comte de Grasse on the next operation. He arrived at Cap Fran‡ois on 13 
Jul, paid his respects to the government officials, and awaited Admiral 
de Grasse who was out with his fleet. Saavedra went to a high hill on 15 
Jul where he could observe the return of the French fleet. Before the 
French fleet vessels could drop anchor, Saavedra had recorded each of 
its 31 vesselÆs armament, apparent condition, and whether or not it had 
copper sheathing.

On 18 Jul 1781, Saavedra and de Grasse met, exchanged credentials, and 
analyzed all the possible operations they could undertake over the 
following year. The French had an obligation to help the American 
colonists which de Grasse wanted to meet, so the two agreed on three 
enterprises: first, strike a blow to aid the Anglo-Americans so strongly 
that the British cabinet would give up subduing them; second, to retake 
the Windward sugar islands the British had occupied; and third, to 
conquer Jamaica. For the first enterprise, the American General 
Washington had proposed two plans to the French, one for retaking New 
York, and two, capturing General Cornwallis, who had overrun the 
Southern Colonies and was then moving toward the sea in Virginia. 
Admiral de Grasse had a plan to take possession of Chesapeake Bay and 
bottleneck and destroy General Cornwallis nearby on land, either in 
Virginia or North Carolina. Saavedra agreed with this plan, further 
stating that Spanish army and naval forces would protect French 
possessions while the French fleet and army were on the Chesapeake Bay 
Expedition. (Spain could not participate with naval and army units as 
she had not yet recognized the United States.) Admiral de Grasse and 
Saavedra drew up the plans for the next year in six copies, and signed 
them as the de Grasse-Saavedra Convention and sent them to their 
respective governments where they were ratified. It was this agreement 
which governed Franco-Spanish operations in the Western Hemisphere for 
the remainder of the war. Admiral de Grasse prepared to take to the 
Chesapeake his entire fleet and all available militia units from the 
French islands.

Then Admiral de Grasse encountered an insurmountable problem. He did not 
have enough money for the operation and could not raise enough on the 
French islands. Rochambeau had written that he only had funds to sustain 
his army through mid-August, and he needed funds to move his army from 
Rhode Island to the Chesapeake. Washington also needed money for the 
American forces. Admiral de Grasse asked Saavedra if he could help. 
Saavedra immediately provided 100,000 pesos from Santo Domingo, which 
was available in Cap Fran‡ois, and promised more which had been in 
Havana when he was last there. Admiral de Grasse set sail through the 
Bahamas so that he could send a frigate to Matanzas, Cuba, to pick up 
the money Saavedra would provide. When Saavedra arrived in Havana on 15 
Aug 1781 to pick up the money in the Spanish treasury, it had already 
been dispatched to Spain. In desperation, Saavedra turned to the 
citizens and soldiers of Havana, who in six hours, provided 500,000 
pesos in specie, which was carried to Matanzas on 16 Aug 1781 to the 
waiting frigate, and which joined the French fleet in the Bahama 
Channel. Later that same day, General Bernardo de Gßlvez arrived in 
Havana from New Orleans, where he had gone after Pensacola as a result 
of the Natchez uprising. He was delighted to learn what had taken place 
at Cap Fran‡ois and for the blueprint of future actions. (Endnote 4.)

When Admiral de Grasse dropped anchor in Chesapeake Bay, he learned that 
Cornwallis and his forces were at Yorktown and at Gloucester; and, to 
Americans, the Chesapeake Expedition became known simply as Yorktown. 
Admiral de Grasse had to fight one naval battle to secure the area, but 
the expedition went through as planned, although British historians 
excuse it as a failure in British naval strategy. After Yorktown, 
Admiral de Grasse became impatient to return to the West Indies for two 
good reasons. First, Saavedra, even with support from General Bernardo 
de Gßlvez, had been unable to get the Spanish navy to provide the 
covering forces for the French islands. Second, de Grasse wanted to move 
on to the next phase of the agreed operations against British occupied 
islands.

Saavedra was busy with specific plans for invading Jamaica during late 
1781 and early 1782, and General Bernardo de Gßlvez moved to Guarico 
(near Cap Fran‡ois) and concentrated Spanish forces there. Saavedra also 
visited Mexico to determine what gunpowder, specie, and other resources 
could be made available for the Jamaica invasion. Admiral de Grasse was 
successful in the retaking of British ûoccupied islands in the second 
phase of operations. However, when Admiral de Grasse began moving land 
forces to staging areas for the third phase, the invasion of Jamaica, he 
was met by British Admiral Rodney at Les Saintes in April 1782 and was 
captured, along with seven of his warships. However, he had saved the 
troopships he had in convoy. To the British, it saved their possessions 
in the West Indies for the moment. For the rest of the war, they were 
aggressively on the defensive in the West Indies. They had no troops nor 
ships for North American adventures. The Spanish and French slowly 
regrouped, and Saavedra worked on with Jamaica invasion plans. The 
French in Dec 1782 moved RochambeauÆs Expeditionary Force from Boston 
and Rhode Island to a staging area in Venezuela where it awaited 
invasion orders. General Bernardo de Gßlvez held together 10,000 French 
and Spanish forces at Guarica, waiting for French and Spanish 
transportation. Saavedra went to France and Spain to expedite plans for 
reinforcements, which were collected at Cadiz, Spain under Count de 
Estaing, who wanted to redeem his reputation in the Western Hemisphere. 
The reinforcements included 12,000 French troops and 24 Spanish ships of 
the line, and other Spanish troops and French ships.

At this point, the failure at Gibraltar in Oct 1782 had taken away the 
Spanish enthusiasm for the war, the French had gained some objectives, 
the Americans were virtually independent, the British were being 
defeated in India, so all were ready to negotiate. The invasion of 
Jamaica never took place, but SaavedraÆs work was not in vain, as far as 
Americans were concerned. He and Bernardo de Gßlvez kept the British 
focused on the West Indies, away from North America for the better part 
of two years. It made Yorktown the last land battle of the Revolutionary 
War, and the decisive one, as far as Americans were concerned. It is 
fair to remember that Yorktown, as we know it, was agreed to as a 
campaign by Saavedra and de Grasse, then financially supported through 
efforts of Saavedra.
It would not have happened without them, and its importance was 
amplified afterwards by the constant pressure on British forces posed by 
the buildup to invade Jamaica.

SaavedraÆs commission ended in Jun 1783, and he became 
Intendant/Governor of Caracas. When he returned to Spain in 1788, he was 
placed on the Supreme War Council. In 1797, he became Minister of 
Finance, and in 1798, Minister of State. He retired to Andulusia from 
this position for reasons of health. When France invaded in 1810, he 
came out of retirement and helped in several positions. He introduced 
several free schools in Triana and took part in development enterprises 
in Spain. When he died 25 Nov 1819, he was buried at La Magdalena.

Endnote 1. Glascock, Melvin Bruce, page 248, footnote 34, New Spain and 
the War for America, 1779-1783, Louisiana State University, PhD 
dissertation, 1969, University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, MI, 1980.

Endnote 2. Glascock, ibid, quoting Bancroft, Hubert H., The History of 
Mexico, 6 vols, San Francisco, A. L. Bancroft Comp., 1883-1888, Vol 3, 
pp 381-381.

Endnote 3. Glascock, ibid, quoting Bustamente, in Cavo, Andr‰s, Los tres 
siglos de Mexico durante el gobierno espa±ol hasta la entrada de 
ejercito trigarante con notas por el Licienciado Carlos Mara de 
Bustamente, 4 vols, Mexico, Imprenta de Luis Abadiano y Vßldes, 
1836-1838, Vol 3, p 42.

Endnote 4. Dull, Jonathan R., The French Navy and American Independence, 
Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1975, pp 249-253. Dull 
clearly understood that Saavedra and Bernardo de Gßlvez were jointly 
responsible for the West Indies Spanish successes, but he misidentified 
Saavedra as an aide to Bernardo, and he mistakenly gave to Bernardo the 
authority which Saavedra held as the KingÆs representative. Bernardo 
knew that Saavedra had gone to Haiti to negotiate with the French, but 
he knew nothing about the resulting negotiations between Saavedra and de 
Grasse, or of the funding arrangements, until Saavedra informed him when 
Bernardo arrived in Havana after the money had been shipped.

Endnote 5. Saavedra de Sangronis, Francisco, loc cit., Journal of Don 
Francisco Saavedra de Sangronis during the commission that he had in his 
charge from 25 June 1780 until June 1784, Gainesville, University of 
Florida Press. Saavedra was a trained and urbane diplomat who was well 
trained to move to high places in sensitive roles. He took no orders 
from anyone except the King he represented, but those orders generally 
came through Minister Jos‰ de Gßlvez. He listened carefully and quietly, 
and took suggestions from those he found to be knowledgeable. However, 
he put up with little nonsense; and officials who did not cooperate and 
do their best soon found themselves out of power. The word got around.