[Granville-Hough] 30 Jan 2010 - GRAB I

[Trustees for Granville W. Hough]

Date: Sat, 30 Jan 2010 08:05:30 -0800
From: Granville W Hough <gwhough at oakapple.net>
Subject: GRAB I - 30 Jan 2010

*AMERICA'S FIRST OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SATELLITES

    Yes, Sullivan's Hollow people were there and involved in the work as 
cold warriors.  They were not fighters as much as thinkers and analysts 
of what the Soviets were doing.
    The Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) Galactic Radiation and 
Background I (GRAB I) was the first U. S. operational intelligence 
satellite.  It was launched in June 1960, only 52 days after a U-2 
plane, with pilot Gary Powers, was lost on a mission over Soviet 
territory at Sverdlovsk.   When GRAB I began sending space-intercepted 
electronic intelligence signals back to Earth, it proved that a 
spacecraft could collect as much information as all sea, air, and 
land-based reconnaissance platforms within the satellites 
field-of-view.  Moreover, it could do so at a fraction of the cost and 
with no personal risk.  The intelligence information it gathered helped 
to keep the Cold War "cold."  Electronic intelligence (ELINT) fed into 
the analysis activities of the National Security Agency (NSA), but the 
output was restricted to a few analysts who had suitable backgrounds.
    GRAB I was soon followed by satellites which photographed Soviet 
activities on the ground.  This replaced the U-2 photography which had 
given numerous breakthroughs on our understanding of Soviet 
developments.  President Eisenhower was very anxious about the security 
of the satellite programs and restricted to 300 the number of persons 
who could have any knowledge of the programs.  The Army was allowed one 
General Staff officer who was selected as Major Granville W. Hough.  
This was not at all pleasing to Granville as he was an Air and Missile 
Defense specialist, and he was automatically asked questions about all 
kinds of Soviet deployments and developments he had never known about 
and had no interest in.  What he wanted to do was to continue developing 
his analyses of how the Soviets could exploit their base in Cuba with 
Medium-range and air defense missiles.  We had placed medium-range 
missiles in Diyarbakir, Turkey, and it was inevitable that the Soviets 
would reciprocate with missiles in Cuba.
    This work was cut short by the Army's inflexible requirement for an 
overseas tour.  The preferred choice was Thule, Greenland, where there 
was no chance of a security breach in case of capture.  So, Granville 
Hough was in Thule, Greenland, when the Cuban crisis developed as 
expected.  The solution was also as anticipated, the USA removed its 
medium-range missiles from Turkey and the Soviets removed their 
medium-range missiles from Cuba.  So it was a tit for tat solution, 
built to order.  Lots of political hay was made by both sides, and there 
was real danger from over-reaction from hot-head advisors and zealous 
field commanders.  From the vantage point in Thule, Greenland, one could 
only hope that the Soviet leadership was more rational than the apparent 
viewpoints in Washington.  In the end, that was the case.
    (Later, when Lt Col Granville Hough was Deputy Commander of the 
Boston-Providence Air Defense Command, he learned that during the crisis 
one of the Battalion Commanders had proposed a plan to detonate a 
nuclear warheaded Nike Hercules at its extreme range in order to blind 
the Soviet planes offshore on the way to Cuba.  This would cause them to 
crash into the ocean.  Fortunately, his plan was disapproved.  If 
carried out, it would likely have begun WW III.)  Granville W. Hough, 
Cold Warrior.