[Granville-Hough] 19 Dec 2009 - Spanish Hero Saavedra

[Trustees for Granville W. Hough]

Date: Sat, 19 Dec 2009 05:19:07 -0800
From: Granville W Hough <gwhough at oakapple.net>
Subject: SpanishHeroSaavedra - 19 Dec 2009

	There is a new book on the Battle of Yorktown which is a popular
Christmas present this year.  I have not seen nor read it.  One of my
contributions to that activity is below, whether the author of the new
book ever heard of Saavedra de Sangronis or not.  What made Yorktown
significant was the continued pressure on the British in the West
Indies, not allowing them to use any one of the four invasion bases they
held at New York, Charleston, Penobscot, and Detroit.

     SPANISH HEROES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: FRANCISCO SAAVEDRA DE
SANGRONIS

  American historians who have encountered the name Francisco Saavedra
have been puzzled and perplexed by it.  In his 1969 dissertation on New
Spain, Melvin Bruce Glascock stated in a footnote: ÃôThe exact identity
of Francisco Saavedra and his mission to New Spain remain a
mysteryÃà(Endnote 1.)  ÃôÃàBancroft describes him as a mysterious stranger
who had no specific duties but who had access to the highest official
circlesÃà (Endnote 2.)  Bustamente has written that Saavedra was an agent
of the Minister of the Indies (JosȨ de GÈílvez) sent to criticize the
unfortunate Viceroy (Mayorga)̈̚ (Endnote 3.)  Jonathan Dull partly
understood the importance of Saavedra but completely misunderstood his
role and activities, inadvertently crediting Bernardo de GÈílvez with
activities and events which were not within BernardoÃÆs authority.
(Endnote 4.)  Caughey, most quoted biographer of Bernardo de GÈílvez,
does not index Saavedra at all.

  To remain ignorant about SaavedraÃÆs role in the Western Hemisphere is
to misunderstand how Yorktown came about, and how that Yorktown victory
was secured by two more years of relentless pressure on British forces
and holdings in the West Indies, holding of which at the time was
BritainÃÆs highest priority.  (BritainÃÆs first objective had been
accomplished when she secured her homeland in the failed invasion of
Britain in the summer of 1779, so her sugar lands and timber sources
moved up to first priority.)  BritainÃÆs third objective of reconquering
her former colonies came to a halt at Yorktown; but it was merely set
aside until her West Indies and other priority objectives could be
managed.  Recall that Charleston, New York,  Penobscot Bay, and Detroit
were staging bases held in readiness for future campaigns.

  Few Americans have ever heard of the de Grass/Saavedra Convention which
governed Franco-Spanish operations in the Western Hemisphere from Jul
1781 until the end of the war.  Yet this Convention set up the
Chesapeake Bay Expedition for de Grasse which resulted in Yorktown.
Most Americans would know that General Rochambeau himself returned to
France, but few have ever learned that his entire Expeditionary Force,
so successful at Yorktown, went to a Venezuela staging area for the
forthcoming invasion of British Jamaica.  Naval buffs all remember the
battle at Les Saintes, where British Admiral Rodney captured French
Admiral de Grasse, but few would recall that de Grasse saved the troops
he was moving into position for the Jamaica invasion.  Few Americans
would know that this invasion was first planned in Spain in 1778, a year
before Spain declared war, and that Saavedra worked on the plan.  Few
Americans would know that ships and men were waiting in Spanish and
French ports as reinforcements for this invasion, and that Marquis de
Lafayette was designated as Governor-to-be of Jamaica. The British were
placed in a position having a noose being tightened, notch by notch, on
their West Indies/Central American holdings.  So they negotiated for
peace on the best terms they could get.  In studying this planned
invasion of Jamaica, as it evolved month by month, one of the most
frequent names encountered is that of Saavedra.

  So, who was Francisco Saavedra de Sangronis?  Born in 1746 to an upper
class family in Seville, he was educated in Granada, by seventeen years
of age a licenciada and doctor.  He was interested in the military, and
both he and Bernardo de GÈílvez served in the campaign against the Moors
in Algiers.  Bernardo in 1776 offered to introduce Saavedra to his
uncle, JosȨ de GÈílvez, who had just taken over the new Ministry of the
Indies.  Saavedra became well acquainted with the GÈílvez family and
resigned his commission in order to join the Ministry of the Indies.
First he did financial planning, though he did get involved in military
strategies as well.  By May 1778, he had taken part in a plan to invade
Jamaica, which alerted Spanish officials in America to the real
probability of war.  In June 1780, while Saavedra was still working on
financial aspects of the war, the news came that General Bernardo de
GÈílvez had captured Mobile.  Pensacola was the next Spanish goal.  At
this time Minister JosȨ de GÈílvez and King Carlos III had become aware
that bureaucratic wrangling in Havana was interfering with the war
effort.  King Carlos III needed a man in the West Indies who knew the
plans and views of the King and Spanish court, who could attend military
juntas and bring leaders into agreement,  who could confer with
officials of allied nations, remit funds from one place to another, and
go freely wherever the KingÃÆ's word and prestige were needed.  In other
words, King Carlos needed someone to knock heads together and get
instant compliance.  Saavedra agreed to take the role, King Carlos III
authorized the appointment, and Saavedra was on his way to America by
first available transportation.  Saavedra very carefully kept a journal,
unfortunately not published in English until 1988, Journal of Don
Francisco Saavedra de Sangronis during the Commission that he held in
his charge from 25 June 1780 until June 1783.  (Endnote 5.).  So, in
this journal and in the confidential letters to Havana and other
officials, it is clear that Saavedra was speaking for the King, who
expected punctual and effective compliance to SaavedraÃÆ's requests.  In
his oral instructions, Saavedra was told to get Pensacola into Spanish
control and eliminate Britain from the Gulf of Mexico; send all
available money to Spain; get Britain out of Central America; unite
French and Spanish units into a joint effort to invade Jamaica and
eliminate Britain from the West Indies, or any other joint operation
which circumstances might dictate.  (There was no mention of North
America, unless it was implied in the last phrase.)

  After several delays in his journey, SaavedraÃÆs vessel, the frigate
Diana, was captured after a spirited fight by the British warship,
Pallas, and the prisoners were taken into Jamaica.  Saavedra,
understanding financial matters, passed himself off as a wealthy
merchant seeking trade opportunities.  Under this guise, he made many
friends and was able to travel around Jamaica and analyze its forts and
harbors.  These analyses gave him the intimate knowledge on how an
invasion could be accomplished.  He also met other Spanish officers,
prisoners from the British invasion of Central America, from whom he
learned the situation of Governor-General MatÈ¡as de GÈílvez of
Guatamala.  Eventually, he was able to get a French cartel ship to take
him to Cuba in Jan 1781, six months after he started on his mission.

  He first met with his old friend Bernardo de GÈílvez, who gave him the
current situation, then with the Governor and Army and Navy Commanders.
A junta was called for 1 Feb, and he negotiated and maneuvered
tirelessly through February in gaining support for the Pensacola
operation and for General MatÈ¡as de GÈílvez in Central America.  As soon
as these forces were on their way in March, he worked somewhat on the
long-range plans for invading Jamaica, but mainly on providing
reinforcements for Pensacola.  Realizing that Pensacola was the priority
objective, he pushed for combined French and Spanish reinforcements and
embarked with them on 9 Apr 1781.  He was able to take part in the final
assaults on the forts at Pensacola and on preparing the surrender terms
for 9 May 1781.  On 16 May he returned to Havana to send to Spain news
of the British surrender.  When he arrived, he found dispatches which
showed results of his earlier reports.  The Governor, the Army
Commander, and the Navy Commander had all been replaced with people with
whom he could work more effectively.  General Bernardo de GÈílvez had
been promoted to Lt General and became the new Army Commander.  Saavedra
sent this news on to Bernardo, who was still at Pensacola.  From the
Minister of the West Indies, JosȨ de GÈílvez, Saavedra received on 18 Jun
instructions that he was to go to Cap FranȺois where he could confer
with French Admiral Comte de Grasse on the next operation.   He arrived
at Cap FranȺois on 13 Jul, paid his respects to the government
officials, and awaited Admiral de Grasse who was out with his fleet.
Saavedra went to a high hill on 15 Jul where he could observe the return
of the French fleet.  Before the French fleet vessels could drop anchor,
Saavedra had recorded each of its 31 vesselÃÆ's armament, apparent
condition, and whether or not it had copper sheathing.

  On 18 Jul 1781, Saavedra and de Grasse met, exchanged credentials, and
analyzed all the possible operations they could undertake over the
following year.  The French had an obligation to help the American
colonists which de Grasse wanted to meet, so the two agreed on three
enterprises: first, strike a blow to aid the Anglo-Americans so strongly
that the British cabinet would give up subduing them; second, to retake
the Windward sugar islands the British had occupied; and third, to
conquer Jamaica.  For the first enterprise, the American General
Washington had proposed two plans to the French, one for retaking New
York, and two, capturing General Cornwallis, who had overrun the
Southern Colonies and was then moving toward the sea in Virginia.
Admiral de Grasse had a plan to take possession of Chesapeake Bay and
bottleneck and destroy General Cornwallis nearby on land, either in
Virginia or North Carolina.  Saavedra agreed with this plan, further
stating that Spanish army and naval forces would protect French
possessions while the French fleet and army were on the Chesapeake Bay
Expedition.  (Spain could not participate with naval and army units as
she had not yet recognized the United States.)  Admiral de Grasse and
Saavedra drew up the plans for the next year in six copies, and signed
them as the de Grasse-Saavedra Convention and sent them to their
respective governments where they were ratified.  It was this agreement
which governed Franco-Spanish operations in the Western Hemisphere for
the remainder of the war.  Admiral de Grasse prepared to take to the
Chesapeake his entire fleet and all available militia units from the
French islands.

  Then Admiral de Grasse encountered an insurmountable problem.  He did
not have enough money for the operation and could not raise enough on
the French islands.  Rochambeau had written that he only had funds to
sustain his army through mid-August, and he needed funds to move his
army from Rhode Island to the Chesapeake.  Washington also needed money
for the American forces.  Admiral de Grasse asked Saavedra if he could
help.  Saavedra immediately provided 100,000 pesos from Santo Domingo,
which was available in Cap FranȺois, and promised more which had been in
Havana when he was last there.  Admiral de Grasse set sail through the
Bahamas so that he could send a frigate to Matanzas, Cuba, to pick up
the money Saavedra would provide.  When Saavedra arrived in Havana on 15
Aug 1781 to pick up the money in the Spanish treasury, it had already
been dispatched to Spain.  In desperation, Saavedra turned to the
citizens and soldiers of Havana, who in six hours, provided 500,000
pesos in specie, which was carried to Matanzas on 16 Aug 1781 to the
waiting frigate, and which joined the French fleet in the Bahama
Channel. Later that same day, General Bernardo de GÈílvez arrived in
Havana from New Orleans, where he had gone after Pensacola as a result
of the Natchez uprising.  He was delighted to learn what had taken place
at Cap FranȺois and for the blueprint of future actions.  (Endnote 4.)

  When Admiral de Grasse dropped anchor in Chesapeake Bay, he learned
that Cornwallis and his forces were at Yorktown and at Gloucester; and,
to Americans, the Chesapeake Expedition became known simply as
Yorktown.  Admiral de Grasse had to fight one naval battle to secure the
area, but the expedition went through as planned, although British
historians excuse it as a failure in British naval strategy.  After
Yorktown, Admiral de Grasse became impatient to return to the West
Indies for two good reasons.  First, Saavedra, even with support from
General Bernardo de GÈílvez, had been unable to get the Spanish navy to
provide the covering forces for the French islands.  Second, de Grasse
wanted to move on to the next phase of the agreed operations against
British occupied islands.

  Saavedra was busy with specific plans for invading Jamaica during late
1781 and early 1782, and General Bernardo de GÈílvez moved to Guarico
(near Cap FranȺois) and concentrated Spanish forces there.  Saavedra
also visited Mexico to determine what gunpowder, specie, and other
resources could be made available for the Jamaica invasion.  Admiral de
Grasse was successful in the retaking of British Ãûoccupied islands in
the second phase of operations.  However, when Admiral de Grasse began
moving land forces to staging areas for the third phase, the invasion of
Jamaica, he was met by British Admiral Rodney at Les Saintes in April
1782 and was captured, along with seven of his warships.  However, he
had saved the troopships he had in convoy.  To the British, it saved
their possessions in the West Indies for the moment.  For the rest of
the war, they were aggressively on the defensive in the West Indies.
They had no troops nor ships for North American adventures.  The Spanish
and French slowly regrouped, and Saavedra worked on with Jamaica
invasion plans.  The French in Dec 1782 moved RochambeauÃÆs Espeditionary
Force from Boston and Rhode Island to a staging area in Venezuela where
it awaited invasion orders.  General Bernardo de GÈílvez held together
10,000 French and Spanish forces at Guarica, waiting for French and
Spanish transportation.  Saavedra went to France and Spain to expedite
plans for reinforcements, which were collected at Cadiz, Spain under
Count de Estaing, who wanted to redeem his reputation in the Western
Hemisphere.  The reinforcements included 12,000 French troops and 24
Spanish ships of the line, and other Spanish troops and French ships.

  At this point, the failure at Gibraltar in Oct 1782 had taken away the
Spanish enthusiasm for the war, the French had gained some objectives,
the Americans were virtually independent, the British were being
defeated in India, so all were ready to negotiate.  The invasion of
Jamaica never took place, but SaavedraÃÆs work was not in vain, as far as
Americans were concerned.  He and Bernardo de GÈílvez kept the British
focused on the West Indies, away from North America for the better part
of two years.  It made Yorktown the last land battle of the
Revolutionary War, and the decisive one, as far as Americans were
concerned.  It is fair to remember that Yorktown, as we know it, was
agreed to as a campaign  by Saavedra and de Grasse, then financially
supported through efforts of Saavedra.
It would not have happened without them, and its importance was
amplified afterwards by the constant pressure on British forces posed by
the buildup to invade Jamaica.

  SaavedraÃÆs commission ended in Jun 1783, and he became
Intendant/Governor of  Caracas.  When he returned to Spain in 1788, he
was placed on the Supreme War Council.  In 1797, he became Minister of
Finance, and in 1798, Minister of State.  He retired to Andalusia from
this position for reasons of health.  When France invaded in 1810, he
came out of retirement and helped in several positions.  He introduced
several free schools in Triana and took part in development enterprises
in Spain.  When he died 25 Nov 1819, he was buried at La Magdalena.

  Endnote 1.  Glascock, Melvin Bruce, page 248, footnote 34, New Spain
and the War for America, 1779-1783, Louisiana State University, PhD
dissertation, 1969, University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, MI, 1980.

  Endnote 2.  Glascock, ibid, quoting Bancroft, Hubert H., The History of
Mexico, 6 vols, San Francisco, A. L. Bancroft Comp., 1883-1888, Vol 3,
pp 381-381.

  Endnote 3.  Glascock, ibid, quoting Bustamente, in Cavo, AndrȨs, Los
tres siglos de Mexico durante el gobierno espaȘol hasta la entrada de
ejercito trigarante con notas por el Licienciado Carlos Marȡa de
Bustamente, 4 vols, Mexico, Imprenta de Luis Abadiano y VÈíldes,
1836-1838, Vol 3, p 42.

  Endnote 4.  Dull, Jonathan R., The French Navy and American
Independence, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1975, pp
249-253.  Dull clearly understood that Saavedra and Bernardo de GÈílvez
were jointly responsible for the West Indies Spanish successes, but he
misidentified Saavedra as an aide to Bernardo, and he mistakenly gave to
Bernardo the authority which Saavedra held as the King'ÃÆs
representative.  Bernardo knew Saavedra had gone to Haiti to meet with
de Grass, but he had no input into the negotiations between Saavedra and
de Grasse, or about the funding arrangements, until Saavedra informed
him.

  Endnote 5.  Saavedra de Sangronis, Francisco, loc cit., "Journal of Don
Francisco Saavedra de Sangronis during the commission that he had in his
charge from 25 June 1780 until June 1784," Gainesville, University of
Florida Press.  Saavedra was a trained and urbane diplomat who was well
trained to move to high places in sensitive roles.  He took no orders
from anyone except the King he represented, but those orders generally
came through Minister JosȨ de GÈílvez.  He listened carefully and
quietly, and took suggestions from those he found to be knowledgeable.
However, he put up with little nonsense and officials who did not
cooperate or helped him only reluctantly soon found themselves out of
power.  The word got around.