[Granville-Hough] 28 Oct 2009 - Revolutionary War

[Trustees for Granville W. Hough]

Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2009 07:01:32 -0800
From: Granville W Hough <gwhough at oakapple.net>
Subject: Rev. War - 28 Oct 2009

WHAT OUR TEACHERS DID NOT TELL US ABOUT THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR

Older SAR members can recall our pre-World War II grade school texts. 
When we read our first American History text, we gloried in the accounts 
of Bunker Hill, Stony Point, Saratoga, and Yorktown. Then we picked up 
our geography text and marveled at the world map with all that pink 
representing the British Empire. No teacher pointed out that these were 
two aspects of the same story: how the United States gained its 
independence and Britain retained its position as a leading world power.

No teacher suggested that the climactic battles which determined these 
outcomes were not fought by the United States but by our allies and 
co-belligerents. The genius of George Washington, John Adams, Benjamin 
Franklin and other founding fathers was not on American battlefields but 
rather in involving BritainÆs traditional enemies to join in fighting 
her on land and sea in Europe, Africa, Central and South America, in the 
West Indies, and in India. As a member of Parliament put it, Britain 
found herself fighting five wars at once, in as many different theatres 
of operation. How many of our teachers could even name the nations or 
naval theatres of operation involved? The United States, Britain, 
France, Sultanate of Mysore, Spain, the Netherlands, or the West Indies, 
the North American, the North European, the Mediterranean, and the 
Indian Ocean theatres.

As soon as France entered the war in early 1778, Britain changed her 
priorities: (1) protect the homeland from invasion; (2) protect the 
sugar islands and timber resources of the West Indies; (3) restore the 
13 colonies to British sovereignty; (4) hold Gibraltar and Mediterranean 
sea bases; and (5) advance British interests in other areas. Britain 
recognized she was in a global war, where naval power was most useful; 
and she use her naval power very well. At the end of peace negotiations, 
Britain had only lost her third priority; and she was able to recover 
faster than the declared winners of the war.

Other things our teachers did not know or did not choose to tell us 
involve the role of clandestine aid and overt aid, the significance of 
Spanish treasure ships, the agreements between Spain and France which 
set the conditions for Yorktown and the Western Hemisphere, and the role 
of American mariners and privateers.

Clandestine and Overt Aid. We now know that Spain and France agreed in 
1776 to provide aid to the 13 American colonies and that this aid was to 
be shared 50/50. This made the Declaration of Independence a feasible 
document, as its framers knew that Spain and France would replace 
Britain as trading partners. We also now know that France and Spain each 
furnished aid separately. Spain provided money and gunpowder at 
particularly significant times. For example, the gunpowder and money 
Governor Gßlvez sent from New Orleans to General Clark and others was 
from Mexico (New Spain), with no French input. That aid moved the 
boundary of the future United States from the crest of the Appalachians 
to the Mississippi River. Another example is that the money which made 
the Chesapeake Bay/Yorktown campaign possible came primarily from the 
Spanish citizens of Havana in a loan to the French Government. With 
regard to clandestine aid, we now know that much of it moved through 
neutral Dutch ports in the West Indies, and that for many months during 
the war, the tiny port of Saint Eustatia became the busiest port in the 
world in numbers of vessels entered and cleared.

Spanish treasure ships have romantic connotations, but few people 
realize the role they played during the Revolutionary war. For 
generations, one of the significant roles of the Spanish navy was to be 
or guard the treasure ships which moved the output of the Spanish Empire 
to the coffers and markets of Spain. These treasure ships originated in 
the Philippines, Peru, Mexico, and formed in convoys at Havana to move 
to the homeland. They carried the products of the Far East, the gold, 
silver, and other minerals from the mines of New Spain and Peru, and 
other trade products. In mid and late 1778, when France was pressuring 
Spain to enter the war, Spanish officials would not even begin talks 
until the treasure ships were all safely in port with the money counted. 
The Spanish officials knew that the conduct of the war depended on 
money, and discussions were pointless without it. This brings up the 
question of the contributions or ordinary Spanish citizens of New Spain 
and other regions. It was their resources, the money from their mints, 
gold and silver from their mines, products of their labor, which was 
moving to Spain to finance the war.

American historians are generally aware of the French-Spanish Treaty of 
Aranjuez in early 1779, where Spain and France agreed on the objectives 
of the war. The United States was not mentioned. Spain wanted France to 
invade England so as to draw forces away from the over-extended Spanish 
areas of New Spain. Spain also wanted France to help retake Gibraltar 
and other British strongholds in the Mediterranean. Few historians, 
however, understand how this treaty was modified by the de Grass - 
Saavedra Convention of July 1781. After the failure of the attempted 
invasion of Britain in 1779, the French wanted to shift the focus of 
operations to the Western Hemisphere. French Admiral de Grass was sent 
to the West Indies with a mandate to coordinate with the Spanish 
authorities there. Don Francisco Saavedra de Sangronis was personal 
representative of King Carlos III in the West Indies and spoke for the 
king. In July, 1782, these two met in St. Domingue (now Haiti), and 
agreed to a three-part series of operations: (1) make a quick fall 
campaign in the Chesapeake Bay area to help trap General Cornwallis; (2) 
recover the sugar islands in the West Indies lost to the British; (3) 
invade Jamaica to eliminate the British center of power in the West 
Indies. Their agreement modified the Treaty of Aranjuez and governed 
subsequent operations in the Western Hemisphere. Admiral de Grasse had 
accomplished the first two objectives when he met his fate at the 
climactic naval battle of Les Saintes while he was concentrating troops 
for the invasion of Jamaica. Britain was still facing an imminent 
invasion of Jamaica when forced into negotiations.

The role of American mariners is generally underplayed by historians. 
They do not note that on practically any day you pick during the eight 
years of war, there were more American men at risk at sea than on land. 
The American colonies were on the eastern seaboard, looking to English 
trade for many of the necessities of life. When English trade was cut, 
they turned to other European outlets, using their mariners as the 
lifeline for arms, ammunition, uniforms, gunpowder, and salt. The trade 
route to Europe was generally to the West Indies to neutral ports, where 
Americans traded tobacco, salt fish, and other goods with ships from 
Europe bringing war materials or with West Indies ships providing salt. 
There was also significant commerce across the North Atlantic. The 
American navy played a small role, with merchantmen and privateers doing 
most of the dirty work. The Americans lost over 2000 ships, with average 
crew sizes of 50 men, and average values per ship of 5000 pounds 
sterling. Many ships were sunk, but the goal was to capture the ship and 
to sell it and its cargo after condemnation by Courts of the 
Vice-Admiralty. Captured crew members were sent to prison, and U. S. 
mariners captured almost as many British prisoners as did American land 
forces. Privateering became such a way of life for mariners that the 
Navy could not find people who would enlist. Privateers were to the 
Revolutionary War what U-boats were in World War II.